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I
SERMON on the Mount expresses the appeal of an ideal good will
and pacifism. So far as it may refer to simple ideas of God and the
soul, corrections derived from Greek thought were wisely made by the
great thirteenth century religious philosophers, Mohammedan, Jewish, and
Christian. The Sermon's communism and anarchism were similarly supplemented and almost superseded by Greek ideas developed and systematized by
medieval thinkers. The child-like dream of affection may unfit the dreamer
for the conditions of human life. It has been treated with a caution which for
some purposes is useful.
Yet the dream appears to have its biological human uses today. A Catholic
symposium, Morality and Modem Warfare, is particularly distinguished by
the contributions of Professor Zahn and Father Murray. Professor Zahn, the
most thoughtful of contemporary religious pacifists, follows the Catholic tradition in appealing explicitly less to affection than to reason. Sanity is imperilled by the animal hatreds of war, and particularly threatened by current
threats of thermonuclear war.
Paradoxically, questionable features of Professor Zahn's statement
strengthen it. Intraspecies lethal violence is limited to special situations among
other animals, while it is universal except for special situations among us. It
is not insane in any familiar sense with us, since it is so nearly universal. Yet
the effects of the war now threatened will be like the effects of insanity, disease,
and consequent destruction.
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The biological sources of hostile destruction are not understood. Predatory
animals, among whom we belong, destroy their prey; but they apparently
"love" it, as we "love" a good roast, and they are little if at all more prone
than herbivorous animals to lethal intraspecies violence. Sexual aggression,
always observably different from fighting, is associated with hormones which
commonly intensify other forms of aggression. Conflict over sexual possession,
a little like our jealousy, is the most often observed source of intraspecies
lethal violence among other animals. There are conflicts over food and territory. Acquiescence in a hierarchy determined with reference to manifest power
is the usual animal adjustment, an adjustment which we often take pride in
not making.
The circumstances of the long childhood peculiar to the human young
doubtless contribute to our hostilities, if they do not account for them. Pleasure and love are accompanied by frustrations, dominations, jealousies, and
fears, interacting with one another, and with the guilts and hostilities to which
they contribute. Identifications and projections occur throughout life. They
take peculiar forms, expressed in the Abraham, Christian, and Wotan legends,
among the middle aged and elders, who-as in many uncivilized tribes--determine policy in our contemporary civilizations.'
The truth in Professor Zahn's approach to conflict is apparent as we explore
its problems. It is better, as Socrates said, to die sane than to live an insane
and unjust life. It is better, as Professor Zahn says, to live and contribute to
life, so long as personal sanity can be maintained, though in the catacombs,
than to participate in modem war, particularly thermonuclear war.
The argument explicitly depends on Greek observation and teaching. Nevertheless it is made by a Christian, and it seems to be influenced in its tone
by the life-giving affection which is the theme of the Sermon on the Mount.
Professor Zahn's pacifism does not appeal to fear, but to health. While we
feel the fear of thermonuclear war, we recognize fear as an emotion which can
dehumanize us. It may also have contradictory and perhaps unexpected social
effects. Fear or panic may for example intensify hostilities and contribute to
the violence which the pacifist wishes to avoid.
Fear may distort our own judgment. If we were threatened today with a
1 Further information about the author's general position on the subject of these comments may be found in some of his earlier discussions, for example Aggression: A Study of
Values and Law, 57 ETHICS (1947 Supp.); The Management and Controlof Aggression, in a
Symposium, SOCIAL WORK AS HUMAN RELATIONS 250 (1949); Biology and Law, 16 U. CHI.
L. REv. 403 (1949); Who Killed the Peace? with Walter Johnson and Philip E. Mosely,
1950 University of Chicago Round Table, March 12, 1950; and The Limits of Law, 61
ETmIcs 270 (1951). Cf. his WAS JUSTICE DONE? THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE ch. 17 (1956).

And see two of his book reviews, 64 ETHICS 325 (1954) (further questions of anthropology);
18 U. CMI L. REv. 821 (1951) (further questions of history). The evolution of the pacifist
opinion presented here, as one example of contemporary reflection, is indicated in the author's Freedom-The Role of the Bar, 17 LAW. GUILD REv. 1, 3-4 (1957); Book Review,
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world which would be forever made up entirely of Nazi concentration camps,
I for one would accept the view that we are threatened with the end of human
value in insanity and injustice. Following Socrates, I would hope to choose
-the high risk, or the certainty, of human annihilation in an attempt to deal
with a threat to all human quality. Here I would hope that we could discount
fear in dealing with an ultimate threat.
Karl Jaspers thinks the present threat is of this character. He urges, in The
Future of Mankind, that it justifies risking what he considers a probability of
thermonuclear war even if that means human annihilation. My own view is
that a little reflection will show the difference between the threat supposed
and the actual one. The difference seems to me sufficiently important to furnish an answer to Dr. Jaspers' views.
Moreover, if we think Dr. Jaspers exaggerates to a critical extent, we may
be warranted in considering possible explanations, which will not of course
answer his case, but which may help us to discount it. He belongs in the Calvinist tradition, where a harsh if not cruel God is to be worshipped in spite
of, or even because of, his part in the predestination of sinners. He belongs
also in the tradition of religious Existentialism, where the myth of Abraham
and Isaac serves to symbolize our devotion to a God however destructive he
may be.
The Catholic tradition is of course not wholly free from similar difficulties.
Professor Zahn has, however, not only an advantage over other pacifists today
in his lack of preoccupation with fear. He has also a critical advantage over
his principal philosophical opponent, in his loyalty to a tradition which includes an Hellenic love of life and an ultimate distaste for destruction.
Professor Zahn of course faces the threat of Soviet rule and of course he
does not welcome it. Christians, he says, would return to a life like that associated with the catacombs, when Rome ruled their part of the world. The
comparison is far from perfect, if only because the Roman rule was old and
somewhat relaxed. It is however a closer comparison than that urged by some
pacifists. Some for example propose that we emulate Gandhi in non-violent
resistance to a Russian conqueror; but Dr. Jaspers is persuasive in pointing
out that Gandhi's success was made possible by the elements of liberalism in
the tradition of his imperial opponent. Some have urged the parallel of the
French Resistance; but the existence and success of the Resistance were made
possible by British, Russian, and American power.
In supporting a pacifist position, I should hope there might be a few heroes
to die if necessary in protest against such gratuitous cruelty as the Slansky
purge in Czecho-Slovakia in 1952. But most of us, I should suppose, would
become involved in daily work. We should have to count on the slow work of
science, industry and cooperation to eliminate whatever new restrictions the
Russians may be so unwise as-to impose upon us.
Professor Zahn, though a Catholic, is of course not representative of Catholic thought. Father Murray is a more representative American Catholic teach-

19621

BOOK" REVIEWS

er. He is of course not a pacifist, any more than was Pope Pius XII. He quotes

Pius, who alone among the popes has made a systematic treatment of modern
war, in dealing with possible human annihilation in war.
In any case, when the employment of this [modem] means entails such an
extension of the evil that it entirely escapes from the control of man, its use
ought to be rejected as immoral. Here it is no longer a question of defense
against injustice and "ofthe necessary safeguard of legitimate possessions,
but of the annihilation, pure and simple, of all human life within its radius

of action. This is not permitted on any account. 2

Depending somewhat on the extent to which we or the Russians or both
can and will control a thermonuclear attack or counter attack, as well as on
the technology of attack and defense, we face a range of destruction, now or
within the next ten years, including total human annihilation.
Three hundred megatons delivered over military targets are the minimum
attack that has been seriously considered. A favorable estimate of fatalitie3,
limited by fallout shelters in prospect, is about five million, an estimate used
in September by Life. Similar force applied to city targets would produce some
fifty million fatalities, according to testimony given last August in support of
a shelter program. Explosions with fifteen hundred fission megaton capacity,
spread in various ways, would produce thirty to seventy million fatalities, with
"minimum" fallout shelters, according to Mr. Herman Kahn, in his comprehensive and thoughtful book, On Thermonuclear War.
Mr. Kahn thinks that American and Russian commanders will control
thermonuclear attacks, limiting them to military targets, and then turning to
threat and bargain. It is this concededly problematical opinion that makes it
possible for Mr. Kahn to consider at all the effects of a twenty thousand
fission megaton attack.
The United States and Russia each apparently can soon have enough
bombs and warheads for this purpose; but each apparently doubts whether
manned bombers, even with air to ground missiles for part of their equipment,
could deliver anywhere near this amount over enemy targets. The general deployment of missiles in the next years will eliminate present obstacles to delivery. Delivery will remain subject to the possible development of new defenses, which ironically would give the first user a great immediate offensive
advantage.
Mr. Kahn thinks and hopes that there is not in existence anywhere a
"Doomsday Machine," using for example something like the means talked
of two or three years ago in connection with the "cobalt" bomb, capable of
destroying human life at once; but if he is read carefully he does not seem
absolutely confident. And he writes that a Doomsday Machine of one sort
or another will be feasible and perhaps achieved within ten years.
2 Quoted in Murray, Theology and Modern War, in THE STATE Or THE QUESTION: MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE

69, 81 (Nagle ed. 1960).
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We have not yet spoken of delayed genetic effects; of the delayed effects of
Strontium-90 on bones and blood; of the delayed and long lasting effects of
Carbon-14; or of the recognized dangers of unknown effects from the two
hundred odd isotopes produced by a thermonuclear attack, in addition to the
three-Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Carbon-14--whose effects have been
studied.
Birds would be destroyed and their nesting places would be eliminated or
ravaged, while some insects would perhaps survive or return, in case of a
large attack. No one knows what the balance between economically destrictive insects and other insects preying on them would turn out to be. Testimony on ecology at last August's hearings was marked by frank statements
by experts of our lack of knowledge about the effects of thermonuclear attacks. The plains, and country areas generally, may be harder to decontaminate than urban areas; and even in an operating agricultural economy Mr.
Kahn observes that the threat of Strontium-90 might lead us to give up producing milk in the United States. Mr. Kahn ingeniously and fairly checks
exaggeration and he courageously argues in some detail that we are resourceful enough to survive and rebuild after any attack he feels called on to consider. In one of his cases, our fifty principal cities are destroyed (but not their
entire populations, it seems) and he thinks we could survive that. He neglects
the ctites' part in distribution, and does not consider the economic consequences for specialized producers in the southern hemisphere as well as here,
but we hope he is right.
Mr. Kahn's military ideas are worth further consideration. We may ask
here only whether we now face "annihilation" within the principle stated by
Pope Pius. We may consider national annihilation; the annihilation of the
populations of the northern hemisphere; the annihilation of our civilization;
or the annihilation of human life. It seems to be the case that we are taking
something like even chances that now or within the next ten years one or
more of these various forms of annihilation will take place. The more one
doubts the psychological feasibility of controlled thermonuclear attacks and
counter attacks, the less unlikely one or more of the various forms of annihilation, within the next ten years, seems to be.
Except that we deal inevitably in probabilities-non-mathematical probabilities-we seem to be in the position designated by Pope Pius as "not [to be]
permitted on any account." Pope Pius' doctrine is an expression of the devotion to life expressed not only in Freud's philosophy, but in the teachings of
Jesus, Aristotle and St. Thomas, as well.
H
Christian teaching is relied on for justification of the idealizations of freedom among us and equality among the Russians. The good will and affection
of the Sermon on the Mount are thought in the West to be expressed in mutual
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respect for one another's ideas and practical choices. The Scriptures contain
the original of the Communist ideal: "to each according to his need; from
each according to his ability."
Yet our ideologies, including our ideologies of economic activity, diverge.
Their divergencies are the most persuasive justification for our conflict, including a possible war. This is not to say that the divergencies are factors
among the origins of the conflict. Communities with rival ideologies live together without conflict, and may be allied-as in both the recent world wars
-against other communities. Communities with similar ideologies may be
enemies. In the First World War the Western democracies had less similarity
of purpose to Tsarist Russia than to Austria-Hungary, whose collision with
Russia in eastern Europe started the war. The relatively liberal, nearly federal
Austria was, however, Catholic and monarchical, and perhaps less similar in
thought to its liberal western enemies than to the relatively illiberal but
clerical-if Orthodox-and monarchical Russia. Ideological divergencies, as
reflection on other familiar cases will remind us, have no simple correspondence to alignments in wars. They are however commonly the most persuasive
justifications for wars once fighting occfirs. Somewhat, though of course not
exactly, as romantic love may be a result of sexual desire, so the idealizations
which occur in conflict may become humanly more important than the
sources of the conflict.
Idealizations in the conflicts between the Greek cities and Persia and between Athens and Sparta are appealed to today as parallels for the present
conflict between "West" and "East." An admirer of the Greek civilization
may indeed get from such comparisons his greatest satisfaction in the present
conflict. Yet the Greeks themselves were skeptical about simple idealizations.
Greek cities in Asia Minor rebelled against the Persian rule, which Greeks
and Jews alike recognized as relatively free and beneficent; and their rebellion
led to the Persian expedition to secure the Persian frontiers.
Thucydides gave an account of the Athenian war, or wars, with Sparta,
in which he examined critically the factors at work in their origins. Pericles'
speech on the dead is a magnificent statement of the advantages of Athenian
democracy. Yet Thucydides ignored attachments to these advantages in his
account of the intricate tensions among the small Greek cities on their small
peninsula, which became a part of the collapse of the incomparable Athenian
society.
Thucydides recognized an economic factor. Athens depended for her life
on her grain trade with Black Sea ports, and her traders were expanding their
trade elsewhere, in competition with that of rival cities. The Periclean "empire" depended partly on tribute for its finance. Nevertheless Thucydides as a
matter of clinical observation treated "interest" as the least of the three principal factors which he saw at work.
Like ideology, the sense of justice or injustice was hardly noticed. What
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were given particular attention were fear, the rational apprehension first of
Persian and later of Greek attack; and-the critical factor, the source of the
threat of attack-the love of honor, or pride, shared by all contestants.
The Greek word for love of honor is untranslatable, like the related
"wrath," the first word in the Iliad and so in western literature, and the related "spirit" in Plato's Republic. The Greeks in their disorderly and perpetually
warring society, with their naturalists' interests, observed the presence of a
factor which Christian thinkers have been disposed to treat as a source of sin
and not a subject for observation.
Trivial events may occasion primitive wars, but Thucydides' observations
seem to furnish an hypothesis about civilized wars which reading and observation constantly confirm. Professor Toynbee treats the rather small scale wars
of Pericles and his successors as a critical turning point in ancient history.
The defeat of Athens did indeed-and perhaps by a close decision-prevent
Athens from ruling the Mediterranean societies, as the less brilliant and more
Spartan Rome later did. Rome did not even conquer Persia, still less rule the
known world, but she left a dream of world rule to the mediaeval society.
Members of that society were constantly at war among themselves. We may
use Professor Toynbee's hypothesis about their critical war to suggest one
other example among the large number and great variety which history, or
just western history, furnishes.
The I1th, 12th and 13th century wars between Hildebrandine Popes and
Salian and Hohenstaufen "Emperors" represent for Mr. Toynbee the critical
wars of the civilization. Both parties were Christian. Each recognized the
function of the other, and had difficulty in articulating its preference for its
own greater share in ruling the turbulent society. It is hard for a critical modem to identify himself with either party, as he is likely to identify himself with
Athens or with England, in their wars. It is an example of the inadequacy of
an ideological theory of war.
Economic factors were present. The Church was often in rough conflict
with kings and emperors over the sources of revenue. But the Hildebrandine
Popes were not like the Renaissance Popes. Innocent III, the most powerful
of them all, was ascetic and as industrious in his diplomacy and his wars as
the late Mr. Dulles. Income for the Church meant to him, so it seems, only
a source of power.
The popes were on the offensive in a revolutionary attempt to enlarge their
power over ecclesiastical and secular affairs alike. No one was much moved
by fear of fighting in that society. The observer can account for the wars in
which Papacy and Empire destroyed one another's remote hope of ruling
Europe, only by the ambitions to which Thucydides referred by his word for
love of honor, or pride.
We have come to accept, to the amazement of anyone who lived through
the period, an account of the war of 1914 which treats it as a mistake. Broad-
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casting with President Eisenhower on August 31, 1959, Prime Minister Macmillan, who fought in the war of 1914, said: "Now the first war I feel ought
never to have happened. It happened by mistake. I believe if we'd had the
same kind of international meetings that we have now it wouldn't have happened. The second war was different ... 3
In his long controversy with Professor Fay, Professor Schmitt, the leading
scholarly defender of the war-guilt provisions of the Versailles Treaty, has
recognized from the beginning the difficulties of his position.4 For my generation, "the Kaiser" was an incarnation of evil, and it is reassuring to find that
Professor Fay is correct, that no such creature existed, and that it was a mistake to think so.
Mr. A. J. P. Taylor has just published a convincing account of The Origins
of the Second World War which treats it as a mistake. His view is that Hitler
was gambling on a fearful but peaceful correction of the European balance
and the worst humiliations of Versailles; and that he would probably have
succeeded in August, 1939, if he had started his critical diplomatic offensive
a day earlier. Hitler was indeed very different from "the Kaiser"; but it is
worth recalling that the worst atrocities" of his regime occurred after fighting
started, and that his foreign policy was what European standards of "honor"
required.
In addition to his persuasive treatment of Hitler's foreign policy, which
seems unaffected by any sympathy with his domestic policy, Professor Taylor
gives an equally persuasive treatment of western and German relations with
Russia in the events leading to the German-Russian agreement for Russian
neutrality in 1939. His account is much more persuasive than Mr. Kennan's
recent account of these events, which does, however, contain three passages
of profound wisdom on-the German and Russian conflicts.5
Mr. Kennan, while effectively arguing our subjective friendliness or toleration, recognizes to what an extent our association with groups hostile to Russia at the end of the First World War contributed to later mutual suspicions
between us and the Soviet Union. He argues for our familiar views about the
purges of the '30's and the Nazi-Soviet neutrality agreement of 1939.
Mr. Taylor, showing respect for the views of our ambassador at the time,
thinks that the truth about the purges is unknown and perhaps undiscoverable. There seems nothing inherently unlikely in the official account of a conspiracy among surviving original intellectual leaders, combined with military
leaders, against the less philosophical Stalin, going back to the hardships and
harshness of 1931-1932, and extending to 1936. In its later stages, the conspiracy may well have been strengthened by a tradition and practice of cooper3 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1959, p. 9.
4 See Schmitt, Review Article: The Originsof the War of 1914 (discussing Luigi Albertini),
24 J. MOD. HISTORY 69 (1952).

5Kennan, pp. 368-69, 391, 398.
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ation with Germany, expressed at Rapallo and before, combined with a sense
of threat from the emerging new Germany. In these days Stalin was turning
to the West, [however tentatively] and the opposition's mistrust of the West
had not yet been vindicated, in Russian eyes, by the events of the summer of
1939. In another connection, Professor Taylor wisely states a presumption
against explaining history, unless the matter is clear, by the madness of leading
participants. However unsatisfactory as a device for policy formation, the
purges of the '30's do not seem acts of simple irrationality or the simple madness of autocratic ambition.
Mr. Taylor thinks the British in 1939 did not want to turn the Nazis, and
the Poles, toward conquest of Russia, if only for reasons of balance. Nevertheless he recognizes, as does Winston Churchill in The GatheringStorm, that the
British missed a chance in 1939 to bring the Russians into the balance against
the Nazis. He recognizes also that the British conduct of their negotiations
with Russians, Poles, and Germans was such as to occasion legitimate fear
of a hostile combination, in the minds of Russian leaders.
It is commonly said that Stalin trusted Hitler. Newspaper accounts at the
time and the record since, including the record of the invasion of Finland,
have seemed to me to indicate the contrary. In fact the record, including those
parts of it discussed in this connection by Mr. Kennan and by Mr. Byrnes in
Speaking Frankly, seems to me to furnish some indication that the Russians
increasingly baited the Germans into attacking before the Germans had time
to defeat the British finally. The Russians' purpose would thus have been to
create a situation in which they could effectively employ their traditional
strategy of active defense, aided by the two-front war which Hitler himself
had condemned as a hypothetical strategic mistake.
Our oversimplification of reactions to the Nazi-Soviet neutrality pact, and
to the Russian invasion of Finland, both of which were understood by
Churchill in a way different from ours, contributed to the cold war. They
doubtless explain the then Senator Truman's declaration of war against both
Germany and Russia immediately upon the German invasion of Russia in
1941.
Well known to both the British and the Russians, if neglected by our Russian experts, that declaration is enough to account for every alleged Russian
breach of good faith occurring after President Truman took office and after
his position was confirmed in September, 1945, in London. President Roosevelt's death, and President Truman's succession, gave a legitimate occasion for
the application to Russian agreements of the familiar qualification, rebus sic
stantibus. An agreement governs, "things remaining the same"; more particularly, in the absence of a threat to a signing nation's power or existence.
The principle could properly be invoked in relation to such clean cut agreements as those setting dates for Russian evacuation of Iran and Manchuria in
1946, which the Russians did not observe. It could be applied to the ambiguous
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provisions and questionable acts of alleged violation of other agreements
affecting Iran and China. It could be invoked with special justification in its
application to Russian renunciation of territorial claims against Japan, in
view of our Japanese occupation policy, beginning with Secretary Byrnes'
refusal to talk about it with the Russians in September, 1945, in London. It
could be applied to the invasion of Korea; but here, in addition, the complete
lack of evidence of Russian participation and our complete ignorance of the
circumstances in which fighting broke out, must leave us skeptical about the
facts charged as a breach of good faith. Rebus sic stantibussufficiently explains
the continued Russian support of revolutionary governments in Lithuania,
Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and elsewhere, strengthened as it doubtless was by
a theory of legitimate revolution differing from but also resembling our own
doctrines of rightful revolution.
Rebus sic stantibus explains even more adequately, if the explanation is
necessary, the Russian positions in 1945 about the marvellously ambiguous
and uncertain supposed agreements at Yalta, affecting Rumania and Poland.
The dispute over these agreements led to Mr. Truman's position about the
Polish agreement in his now well known conversation with Molotov just before the end of the German war, which could fairly have been understood, in
the context of the time, as a second declaration, this time of cold war. 6
For all the intervening years, threats, counter-threats, concessions, and
threats in turn have followed one another. Arrangements for the occupation
of Germany have been at once ambiguous and uncertain and particularly subject to the qualification of rebus sic stantibus.From 1947 until 1949, in 1958-9,
and again today, these arrangements about our conquered foe have given rise
to the ambivalent threats of war and hopes of peace, on both sides, which are
like the phenomena to which Mr. Taylor draws attention in his account of
the events leading to the Second World War.
Mr. Kennan and Mr. Taylor, without discussion, both seem to think that
any questions of justice raised by the interwar conflicts, result from the interplay of fear and destructive domination, particularly the latter. There is always
an accompanying ambivalent conscious hope for victory without destruction.
Nevertheless, in the interaction of attitudes toward the two possible kinds of
victory, which for example Mr. Taylor attributes to Hitler, one can detect the
attraction of force, which can be detected also among the harried prime ministers of July and August, 1914, the great medieval popes, and the leaders of
the 5th century Greek cities. If one's attention is arrested by such observations, one can see the same factors in today's newspaper accounts of the
threats and conciliations of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev and their
advisers.
6

See FLE

NG, Tm COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINs 265-70 (1961). Professor Fleming's

fresh and critical volumes came to my attention too late to be included among the subjects
of the present discussion.
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The new factor today is a rather widespread and rational apprehension of
destruction on a new scale. Under some circumstances, disorder within a
society has appeared worse than the irrational and cruel law, for example the
law of ordeals, which was available. The punishment of "treason" in the great
17th century in England was more savage than anything we have seen in our
time except the Nazi concentration camps. As long as we avoid a complete
and permanent Nazi concentration camp society, we may keep our mutual
regard and our self confidence; and we may choose, rather than national or
human annihilation, a government by either of the great contending poweri.
Such a suggestion has, of course, little present political appeal, and it can be
read by a practical man, either here or in Russia, only as a way of emphasizing the importance of mutual concessions and agreement.

IIi
Mr. Herman Kahn is known primarily as a critic of those who consider a
thermonuclear war out of the question, whether as a matter of expectation or
as a matter of practical policy. The equilibrium of mutual deterrence seems
to him in any likely future to be subject to quite possible destabilization. He
thinks that preparation by organizing civil defense evacuations and shelters
and by planning for controlled war may enable us to survive for a more happy
future.
He is by no means an enthusiast for thermonuclear war. He considers our
ideological differences inadequate to explain the conflict between the United
States and Russia; and he recognizes that a compromise of our theoretical
differences would be a reasonable price for avoiding thermonuclear war.7
Returning in other respects to our position in 1942-1945, he observes that
each country recognizes itself as a status quo country, with no simple interests
in territorial expansion or conquered economic resources. "It is probably true
that the major thing that the Soviet Union and the United States have to fear
8
from each other is fear itself."
So far as he depends on a simple fear theory of war, Mr. Kahn may betray
a bias which seems to affect him elsewhere. The revolution, including the
palace rebellion, is the simplest answer to any general fear theory of warfare.
Revolutionists are frequently quite free of any superficial fear, at any rate;
and once this is noticed, an observer is ready to consider the greater importance attached by Thucydides to "pride" and combativeness. Nevertheless
fear is an important component of many sequences, including no doubt the
present one. It may be indeed that a "deep" fear is the most common source
of pride.
However that may be, Mr. Kahn wisely discounts the most popular current
explanations of our conflict with Russia. He does not for that reason think
that war is out of the question, nor does he by any means discount the importance of our victory if war occurs.
7 Kahn, p. 226.

8P. 568.
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He does think that surrender is preferable to national destruction, say fifty
million deaths resulting immediately from an attack; and still more clearly
preferable to human annihilation. 9 He thinks we should not say so 0 except
in such an obscure way as his. Victory without annihilation seems to him important and possible, and it will be facilitated, perhaps even without war, if
we do not encourage the Russians to expect surrender.
We have seen that Mr. Kahn faces heavy destruction of people and wealth,
as probable consequences of thermonuclear war. He emphasizes the importance of evacuation and shelters in minimizing loss. Yet when he deals with
the "late" attack, twenty thousand fission megatons deliver~d, say in 1969 or
1973, he is unwilling to depend entirely on civil defense to prevent losses
which he concedes to be unacceptable.
He recognizes that his conservative estimates of both the genetic and
somatic effects of such an attack, persisting after any reasonable period in
shelters, are not really dependable;I1 and apparently our ignorance of the.
unstudied isotopes involved in such an attack12 leaves open the possibility of
disastrous unknown consequences. It is not a matter simply of exaggerating
unknown dangers; the known dangers are serious enough, so that an appreciable chance of unknown additions leads to an increase in apprehension
which seems rational.
In dealing with the immediate casualties likely to result from a "late"
attack, Mr. Kahn gives us what seems to be his only muddled table. On the
following page he seems to recognize that his computations as they stand are
unconvincing, and that for our survival we must come to count on the general
acceptance of a principle of controlled thermonuclear (or other) war. 13
If read carefully, Lecture I, primarily concerned with civil defense, can be
understood only with the aid of Lectures II and III, in which the character
and importance of the theory of the controlled war become increasingly clear.
In the second chapter of Lecture H, a discussion of the circumstances in
which a thermonuclear war, if it occurs, is most likely to originate, makes
one contribution to the theory of the controlled war. Perhaps because he
thinks that neither great party is seriously interested in world conquest, perhaps because of the extent to which mutual deterrents seem to him effective,
perhaps for both reasons, Mr. Kahn discounts the danger of unprovoked
deliberate attack. He thinks the three most likely sets of circumstances in
which thermonuclear war may originate are to be classed as "accidents," the
next three as "miscalculations," the next three as "calculations" in fear and
crisis situations, and the next two, in order, as "preventive war" and "world
domination." Only "catalytic" wars are considered still more unlikely.14 An
9 Pp. 523-25. Cf.pp. 35, 149, 170-71, 174-75, 225, 226 & 226 n.10, 545, 561.
10 Pp. 525, 527.
12 pp. 62, 71.
11 Pp. 74, 92.
13 pp. 113-14. See also, particularly, p. 518.
14 See p. 227, Table 36, which follows a related discussion beginning on p. 190 and precedes one ending on p. 231.
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appropriate response to an accident, or even a miscalculation or a calculation
in crisis, would hardly be a "late,". twenty thousand fission megaton attack,
on either side.
Moreover, in view of the present defenses against manned bombers and the
time it will take to multiply missiles which can be fired accurately and with
heavy impact, there will be a period in which each side will have strong reasons for giving priority to military targets, say missile bases, to prevent retaliation by the other. As forces increase, in the absence of what Mr. Kahn has

considered an unlikely discovery of effective defensive weapons against mi§siles, it will still be apparent that military objectives must have priority.
Though Mr. Kahn is not confident on this point, the common sense advantages of conquering a going economy will strengthen a tendency to give secondary priority, even if enough weapons are available for them, to cities and
country areas.

Difficulties about guidance, about knowing where to aim, and about the
relations between impact and shelter, may be or may be thought to. be obstacles to an effective attack or counter attack directed at military objectives.
In such a case, though Mr. Kahn does not say so, a commander might attack
one or two cities. He may plan a pause after his first attack, on military objectives or cities or both, and offer to bargain. If a first attack promises much
heavier destruction in case it is resumed, a cool government in the country
attacked, at least if its retaliatory forces are somewhere nearly destroyed,
will, in Mr. Kahn's opinion, surrender.
Mr. Kahn deals separately with the problem of shelter for military objectives against thermonuclear weapons, including one hundred megaton bombs.
He finds the problem not insoluble. When he passes to the problem of protecting other objectives as well, as means of attack develop over the next ten
or fifteen years, he recognizes that though shelter may help, our protection
will increasingly depend on decisions to conduct war "carefully." 15 He may
have in mind a revival of interest in "clean" explosions.
One reader finds it useful to remind himself from time to time that in ten
or fifteen years he will be seventy-five or eighty and his eldest grandchild, a
grandson, twenty or twenty-five. Any reader may then multiply the cases
until he reaches the figure which he may choose to stand for national annihilation, or the human annihilation which, with the feasibility or existence of
Doomsday Machines, will then be in reach.
In his Lecture II Mr. Kahn has thoughtful and persuasive sections on the
necessity and means of developing agreements, explicit or tacit, to serve in
preventing, or controlling and moderating, thermonuclear war. In his Lecture
III, surveying the development since 1914 and that to be guessed at or expected
until 1977, Mr. Kahn repeatedly recognizes the steadily increasing importance
of such agreements. Indeed his treatment of the controlled war has, as one of
iS P. 518.
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its modestly half avowed objects, the purpose of promoting acceptance by
both the United States and Russia of something comparable to the regard for
non-combatants which was part of the old so-called international law. One
great question presented by his theory of the controlled war is whether the
theory, and the considerations to which it draws attention, are likely to be
practically effective.
While it seems no longer useful to try to determine the odds for or against
war, it seems that the odds against control in case of war are appreciable,
although public argument for control may have done something to reduce
them. The pride and combativeness that will be aroused by any attack seem
likely to be such as to produce a counter attack with any force that may
remain. If the attacker thinks this is so, and if he has any doubts about his
ability to destroy retaliatory forces completely, he may well use his military
resources to the limit for the purpose of completely disabling the society
attacked.
It is to be noticed that our "attacker" may well be one who has been subjected to a mistaken or miscalculated attack himself, or a calculated attack
influenced by fear or crisis. He may have no means of knowing about the circumstances. In some cases at least the values and impulses connected with
pride and combativeness will influence him. He will to that extent become less
like players in cooler games, and less subject to the reasonable kind of fear
that may lead to reasonable action.
Moreover, if ordinary competition in bases and weapons continues, the
ideal controlled attack or counter attack on military objectives will automatically tend to become heavier and heavier. It may be moderated by the development of interest in "clean" explosions. On the other hand, it may come to
coincide with the "late" attack, of which we have considered the effects,
immediate, genetic, somatic, ecological and economic. As the progression
develops, what may at some point be a protective institution, will tend to become itself an instrument of annihilation. Effective control may require, as
Mr. Kahn at points seems to recognize, effective arms control, which is not
now in view.
If these are the likelihoods, they are strong reasons for us to regard the
principle of Pope Pius, and for us or preferably the Soviet Union to acquiesce
in the best terms on which one will concede military hegemony to the other.
At least if the change is made without war, the way can be prepared for the
evolution here and abroad of a more humane society than any the world
has known. The society will be protected by a power which may at first apply
a rather crude law, but a law which in the course of time may well come to
promote peace and mutual regard. If there is any doubt about the application
of the teaching of Pope Pius to the present situation, one may still find it an
occasion for agreeing with Professor Zahn, and for recognizing the anarchism
of the Sermon on the Mount as the best single guide to a current philosophy
of law.

